Diplomacy

Dayton and a sidelined Kosovo (1995)

The peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, reached at Dayton in November 1995 and signed in Paris in December of the same year, ended the war in Bosnia but did not address Kosovo. Kosovo Albanian representatives were not party to the talks, while Slobodan Milošević was treated as an indispensable interlocutor for implementing the peace. Dayton thus marked a moment when Kosovo's political problem remained off the main international agenda.[1][2]

In the historical literature, Dayton is often read as a turning point in Kosovo Albanian political thinking. On this interpretation, international silence weakened confidence that the strategy of peaceful resistance led by the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova would bring political results, and strengthened the hand of those who argued for armed resistance. This is a causal link argued by scholars, not a single proven fact; other factors, such as the collapse of public order in Albania in 1997, are covered in the 1996–1997 chapter.[1][3]

The Contact Group and the 1998 resolutions

After the killings in Likoshan and Qirez and the attack on Prekaz in late February and early March 1998, Kosovo became a regular item for the Contact Group — the diplomatic format of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. Positions within the group differed: Russia opposed coercive measures against Belgrade, while some Western governments pressed for stronger pressure. These differences were reflected in the texts of the UN Security Council.[1][4]

Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The text condemned both the excessive use of force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators and acts of terrorism attributed to the Kosovo Liberation Army. This language should be read in the diplomatic context of March 1998; it was not a permanent legal determination, and international attitudes towards the KLA shifted over the course of the year. The context is explained in the research article on the labels applied to the KLA.[5]

Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded a ceasefire, the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression, unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and the safe return of the displaced. Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998 endorsed the agreements establishing the OSCE verification mission and NATO air verification. Neither resolution explicitly authorized the use of force — a point that became central to the later debate about the intervention.[6][7]

The October 1998 agreement and the OSCE Verification Mission

In October 1998, as NATO prepared orders for possible air strikes, US envoy Richard Holbrooke negotiated a package of agreements with Milošević. They provided for a reduction of Serbian and Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, a civilian OSCE verification mission and NATO verification flights over Kosovo. The KLA was not a party to these agreements. The October agreement averted bombing for the time being, but it did not create a political process accepted by all sides.[8][1]

The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was established by a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council and headed by US diplomat William Walker. The verifiers were unarmed; their task was to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and report violations. The mission's reporting, later compiled in Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, remains among the most important contemporaneous sources for October 1998 to March 1999.[9][10]

According to reporting at the time, the ceasefire was frequently violated during the winter of 1998–1999, both by Serbian and Yugoslav forces and by KLA units. The killings at Reçak on 15 January 1999, which Walker publicly attributed to Serbian security forces, changed the diplomatic tone: the Yugoslav authorities contested the mission's account, while the Contact Group summoned the parties to talks at Rambouillet. How Reçak was documented, and what remains disputed, is examined in the research article Reçak: what we know and how we know it.[10][11]

Rambouillet and Paris (February–March 1999)

The talks at the château of Rambouillet near Paris ran from 6 to 23 February 1999, co-chaired by the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France. The mediators were Christopher Hill for the United States, Wolfgang Petritsch for the European Union and Boris Mayorsky for Russia. The Kosovo Albanian delegation included representatives of the KLA, the LDK, the United Democratic Movement and independent figures, and was headed by Hashim Thaçi; its members also included Ibrahim Rugova and Veton Surroi.[1][4]

The draft agreement provided for broad autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, self-governing institutions, a three-year interim period and, after it, an international meeting to determine a mechanism for a final settlement. The package also included a NATO-led multinational military force to implement the agreement. For Kosovo Albanians the key issue was final status; for Belgrade, the presence of an international force in Kosovo.[12][8]

At the close of the Rambouillet round, the Albanian delegation did not sign immediately and asked for time to consult. At the Paris conference, on 18 March 1999, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the text; the Yugoslav and Serbian delegation did not, and put forward amendments that the mediators regarded as reopening core principles. The talks were suspended on 19 March. On 20 March the OSCE verifiers withdrew from Kosovo, and four days later NATO's air campaign began.[1][4]

The Appendix B debate

Appendix B of the Rambouillet draft set out the status of the multinational military force, including freedom of movement for NATO personnel. After the war, some critics argued that these provisions — which on their reading extended across the whole territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — had been drafted so that Belgrade could not accept them, and that the talks had therefore been a prelude to military intervention.[12]

Other scholars and participants counter that such provisions resembled ordinary status-of-forces agreements, that they were not at the centre of the negotiations, and that Belgrade's principal objection was to any international force inside Kosovo. This archive treats the point as a disputed historical interpretation: the text of the appendix is a verifiable document, while the drafters' intentions and its weight in the failure of the talks are assessed differently by different scholars. The positions are compared in the interpretation set “Rambouillet — Appendix B”.[1]

June 1999: from the G8 principles to Resolution 1244

Diplomacy continued in parallel with the air campaign. On 6 May 1999 the G8 foreign ministers, including Russia, adopted general principles for a political solution. In early June, the European Union's envoy Martti Ahtisaari and the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin presented a joint plan to the Yugoslav leadership in Belgrade, which accepted it on 3 June. Both documents were later annexed to Resolution 1244.[8][13]

On 9 June, in Kumanovo, representatives of KFOR and of the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities signed the Military Technical Agreement, which set the timelines and zones for the withdrawal of forces. On 10 June NATO suspended air strikes and the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, placing Kosovo under interim UN administration (UNMIK) with an international security presence (KFOR), pending a final settlement. KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June.[14][13]

Resolution 1244 spoke of substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, taking into account the Rambouillet accords, and did not determine final status. This formula left the status question open for almost a decade, until the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 — an event that belongs to the postwar period and is treated separately.[13]