Editorial status: Awaiting verificationDrafted from the cited sources; not yet fully reviewed by the editors.
Abstract
In 1998–1999 the same organization was called "terrorist", "insurgent", "a party to the conflict" and "a liberation army". This article explains who used each label, when, in what context, and how the international position shifted within a few months. It separates political language from legal findings and academic analysis, and concludes with the principle that no label replaces evidence about the specific acts of individuals.
Evidence summary
- Evidence status: Documented. Supported by contemporaneous documents, institutional reports or independent studies that corroborate one another.
- Evidence status: Judicially established. Established in a final court judgment. It covers only what the court found, not every later interpretation.
Contents (8)
- 01Why labels matter
- 02Belgrade: the language of "counter-terrorism"
- 03Diplomacy in 1998: from "terrorist group" to interlocutor
- 04The Security Council: a twofold condemnation
- 05The courts: a party to an armed conflict
- 06Scholars: insurgency, guerrilla war, liberation movement
- 07The debate over origins
- 08Labels and individual responsibility
In 1998–1999 the same organization was called "terrorist", "insurgent", "guerrilla", "a party to the conflict" and "a liberation army". Each word came from a different actor, at a different moment and for a different purpose. This article separates these labels according to their context, because a political label is neither a timeless fact nor evidence of specific acts.
Why labels matter
Labels have consequences. For a state, calling an armed group "terrorist" justifies police operations and limits negotiation. For diplomats, accepting a group as an interlocutor gives it political weight. For courts, whether a group is sufficiently organized determines whether international humanitarian law applies. For Kosovo Albanian society, the name "liberation army" expresses an understanding of the war as liberation from repression [1].
None of these perspectives can erase another simply by repeating its own word. The historian's task is to explain who used each term, when and why — and what changed afterwards.
Belgrade: the language of "counter-terrorism"
The Serbian and Yugoslav authorities consistently called the KLA a terrorist organization and described their operations in Kosovo as counter-terrorist actions. The same language was used for the operations in Likoshan and Qirez and in Prekaz in 1998, during which many people who were not taking part in the fighting were also killed [2] [3].
Scholars note that this framing served to present the conflict as an internal matter of public order and to resist international involvement. In practice, it did not draw a clear distinction between armed fighters and the civilian population in the areas of operation.
Diplomacy in 1998: from "terrorist group" to interlocutor
On 22 February 1998, in Prishtina, US special envoy Robert Gelbard publicly described the KLA as a terrorist group, and he repeated the assessment in Belgrade the following day [3]. A few days later Serbian police operations in Drenica began. Some scholars and journalists have argued that Belgrade read the statement as permission to act; others stress that the operations had their own internal logic. This remains a matter of interpretation.
Within a few months the international position shifted. As the uprising spread and the humanitarian crisis deepened, US diplomats opened direct contacts: in the summer of 1998 Richard Holbrooke met KLA members in Junik [4]. By February 1999, KLA representatives formed a central part of the Albanian delegation at Rambouillet.
How do we know this?
US special envoy Robert Gelbard publicly described the KLA as a terrorist group in Prishtina on 22 February 1998 and repeated the assessment in Belgrade the following day.
Evidence status: Documented. Supported by contemporaneous documents, institutional reports or independent studies that corroborate one another.Last reviewed: 16 September 2026Some scholars and journalists argue that the statement was read in Belgrade as a green light for police operations in Drenica; this is an interpretation, not an established fact.
In the summer of 1998 US diplomats, including Richard Holbrooke, publicly met KLA members in Kosovo.
Evidence status: Documented. Supported by contemporaneous documents, institutional reports or independent studies that corroborate one another.Last reviewed: 16 September 2026
The Security Council: a twofold condemnation
Security Council Resolution 1160, adopted on 31 March 1998, condemned both the excessive use of force by Serbian police against civilians and peaceful demonstrators and acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army. The resolution also imposed an arms embargo [5].
The wording reflects the diplomatic balance of the time: the Security Council did not accept armed rebellion as a lawful means, but nor did it accept the use of state force against civilians. The resolution was not a judicial ruling on the nature of the organization, and the later resolutions of 1998 focused increasingly on the humanitarian crisis [6].
How do we know this?
Security Council Resolution 1160 (31 March 1998) condemned both the excessive use of force by Serbian police against civilians and peaceful demonstrators and acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Evidence status: Documented. Supported by contemporaneous documents, institutional reports or independent studies that corroborate one another.Last reviewed: 16 September 2026
The courts: a party to an armed conflict
International criminal courts are not in the business of assigning political labels. For them the question is legal: did an armed conflict exist, and were the parties sufficiently organized for international humanitarian law to apply? In the Limaj et al. and Haradinaj et al. cases, ICTY trial chambers found that the KLA was an organized armed group and that an internal armed conflict existed in Kosovo during the period of the charges in 1998 [7] [8].
This finding has two consequences. First, it treats the war as an armed conflict, not merely a policing matter. Second, it means that KLA members, like any party to a conflict, were bound by the obligations of humanitarian law. Individuals were charged with specific violations; some were acquitted, others convicted. None of these decisions declared the organization as a whole to be criminal.
How do we know this?
In the Limaj et al. and Haradinaj et al. cases, ICTY trial chambers found that the KLA was a sufficiently organized armed group and that an internal armed conflict existed in Kosovo during the period of the charges in 1998.
Evidence status: Judicially established. Established in a final court judgment. It covers only what the court found, not every later interpretation.Last reviewed: 16 September 2026The finding is legal in nature: it concerns the applicability of international humanitarian law and is not a political or moral judgment on the organization.
Scholars: insurgency, guerrilla war, liberation movement
The academic literature uses different terms depending on the question it asks. Studies in military history speak of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, describing structure, recruitment and tactics [1]. Studies of diplomacy analyse the KLA as an actor that changed the calculations of the great powers [9] [4]. International humanitarian law uses the neutral term "non-state armed group".
"Liberation army" is the organization's own name and the name under which it lives on in Kosovo's public memory. This archive uses the organization's name, recognizes its historical importance and, at the same time, presents the other labels together with their context.
The debate over origins
The labels are also tied to the debate over the KLA's origins. Different accounts place its beginnings in the diaspora networks of the People's Movement of Kosovo, in local armed groups in Drenica and elsewhere, or in the interaction of both. The dates of the first actions and the names of the founders vary by source, and participants' later accounts often also reflect postwar political rivalries [1] [3].
Differing interpretations
How and when did the KLA come into being?
A · The LPK's political networks
On this view, the decision to create an armed structure was taken within LPK circles, especially in the diaspora, in the early 1990s, and the KLA was the product of a long-term political strategy.
B · Local resistance
This approach emphasizes family and village groups, particularly in Drenica, that resisted the Serbian police from the early 1990s, and sees the KLA as a networking of these local nuclei.
C · Participants' memoirs
Memoirs published after the war give different dates and different names of founders. They are important sources, but they were often written amid postwar political rivalries and contradict one another.
Note on perspective: These approaches are not mutually exclusive. The archive describes the KLA's emergence as a process with several roots and does not proclaim a founding date without contemporaneous documents to support it.
Labels and individual responsibility
No label replaces evidence of specific acts. Calling an organization "terrorist" does not prove that every member committed crimes; calling it a "liberation" army does not prove that none did. Criminal responsibility is individual and is established in court, through due process and with the right to a defence.
That is why this archive keeps the history of the organization, public memory and the trials of individuals separate — while linking all three to their sources.
Notes
- [1]James Pettifer. The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948–2001. Hurst Publishers, Londër, 2014-01. https://hurstpublishers.com/book/the-kosova-liberation-army-2/. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [2]Human Rights Watch. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo: Vol. 10, No. 9 (D). 1998-10-01. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/kosovo/. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [3]Tim Judah. Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press, 2000. https://books.google.com/books/about/Kosovo.html?id=TDmwQgAACAAJ. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [4]David L. Phillips. Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. The MIT Press, 2012-07-20. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9590.001.0001. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [5]Këshilli i Sigurimit i OKB-së. Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998). 1998-03-31. S/RES/1160 (1998). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1160(1998). Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [6]Këshilli i Sigurimit i OKB-së. Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998). 1998-09-23. S/RES/1199 (1998). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1199(1998). Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [7]Tribunali Penal Ndërkombëtar për ish-Jugosllavinë (ICTY). Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. (IT-03-66) — faqja e çështjes. IT-03-66. https://www.icty.org/en/case/limaj. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [8]Tribunali Penal Ndërkombëtar për ish-Jugosllavinë (ICTY). Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84 dhe IT-04-84bis) — faqja e çështjes. IT-04-84. https://www.icty.org/en/case/haradinaj. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [9]Ivo H. Daalder, Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. Brookings Institution Press, 2001-10-01. https://www.brookings.edu/books/winning-ugly/. Accessed 2026-09-16.
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