Editorial status: Awaiting verificationDrafted from the cited sources; not yet fully reviewed by the editors.
Source basis
Academic monographs on the diplomacy of 1995–1999.
For many Kosovo Albanians, Dayton — which left Kosovo out — revealed the limits of the peaceful strategy [1]. Three years later, Holbrooke's meeting with KLA members was read as a sign that international actors were accepting the KLA as a political reality [2].
The October 1998 agreement temporarily averted air strikes but did not stop the conflict. Scholars debate whether it was a viable settlement or merely a postponement of the crisis [3].
Sources
- [1]Tim Judah. Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press, 2000. https://books.google.com/books/about/Kosovo.html?id=TDmwQgAACAAJ. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [2]David L. Phillips. Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. The MIT Press, 2012-07-20. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9590.001.0001. Accessed 2026-09-16.
- [3]Ivo H. Daalder, Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. Brookings Institution Press, 2001-10-01. https://www.brookings.edu/books/winning-ugly/. Accessed 2026-09-16.
Last reviewed:
Report an inaccuracy